I'm writing an essay on the conflict between a cop's duty and their personal beliefs. If you are/have been a cop/correctional officer please answer any or all of the following questions.
1. What situations may 'cause this conflict? (protecting KKK rallies, inmates)
2. What runs through your mind in these situations?
3. Do you have a choice to participate or not? Do you think you should have a choice? If you did have the choice, would you opt out of it or does your belief in your duty come before your other beliefs?
5. What is the atmosphere around the station like after such an event?
Also, if anyone knows any website where I can find more information on these topics I'd greatly appreciate it.
If you have something negative to say about cops, I don't wanna hear it. You'd be wasting your time and you need to evalute the role cops play in your safety. You hate that they exist because they're doing their job yet you complain when they can't come to your rescue.
the only difficult, or "sticky" situations i have encountered with law enforcement are as follows:
racial tension
religious beliefs and adversity
animosity/cinicism toward officers.
racial tension comes into play while working in situations such as; for example
a white officer shoots at a black male, due to the subject making a "furtive movement"...the officer was undoubtedly ensuring his own safety and the well-being of others, yet the family and friends of the subject claim "racial bias"....this happens often and can cause a great officer to lose thier career, fall to depression, and lose everything they have ever owned.....all because they were enforcing the law and saving some lives.
religion is a rough subject no matter where you work or what your situation...due to all of the different denominations and religions that work in law enforcement, we are forced to come in contact with people who hold opposite values of our own, for example...we hold a training/field day twice a year...before each of our meals, someone always holds a prayer. a few members of our team are athiest...and some are of different religous backgrounds, although they make no argument against the rest of us praying...they may feel left-out or uncomfortable. still we force our religion on no-one and we respect each others beliefs.
also, we are met with hate and animosity each and everyday simply because we wear uniforms. civilians do not notice the people who are behind the badges...they only see "cops"
this may be the reason so many criminals are quick to fire a weapon at us. people in this generation do not see law officers as people...they tend to view us as government "tools" unhuman in nature, and unrealistic in value. i believe
i speak for my comrades when i say ..please understand that we as officers are people also, people with families...people with feelings...people doing our jobs.
if this were not so, if we were merely entities of the state, we would not bust our butts in hours of training and risk our lives everyday for the small paycheck we earn.
did you know that many of law officers are working for lower-class wages, and even though our benifits are good...we still pay all of the same taxes..all of the co-pays..and at the end of the day we are just thankful to make it home alive.
we are never asked to place our personal beliefs on the "back burner", but we are required to believe that the job we do makes a difference...no matter how big or small....
in my department, many of us share the moto.."we work for God"....and i am proud that this is my job.
the next time you see a law officer...smile, and thank them..even in the smallest way.
we don't forget faces.
The Legal Duty of Care in Tort Law, Foreseeability of Injury
DUTY OF CARE IN TORTS LAW, LIABILITY, FORESEEABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS, NUISANCE
Duty of care in Donaghue -v- Stevenson 1932 was defined as exercising such care as is due in such 'acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure persons so directly affected that you ought reasonably to have them in contemplation' and Caparo Industries -v- Dickman 1990 referred also to situations in which it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose.
This duty is owed to one in physical proximity: e.g., in Haseldine -v - Daw 1941 to user of a lift negligently repaired, Buckland -v- Guilford Gas Light 1941 to child electrocuted by low cables upon climbing a tree, but not to a mother for shock nor for miscarriage to one who was to be who the driver and the rider could not to have known that were around in King -v- Phillips 1953 and Bourhill -v- Young 1942; or to one in legal proximity: e.g., in Donaghue -v- Stevenson 1932 for illness of consumer from manufacturer's drink purchased by another, but not if immune as public policy in Hill -v- Chief Constable 1988, or as barristers or judges - Saif -v- Sydney Mitchell 1980; or to one with blood-ties: e.g., in McLoughlin -v- O'Brien 1982 to a mother who by news of accident 'it was obvious that would be affected' ~it can be owed for financial loss in special professional relationships -Mutual Life Assurance -v- Evett 1971, for careless words not made clear as being without responsibility -Hadley Byrne -v- Heller & Partners 1964, and for serious nervous shock -Reilly -v- Merseyside RHA 1994.
The harm, additionally, if reasonably foreseeable is -Fardon -v- Harcourt 1932, negligence may entitle to damages, even punitive, Rookes -v- Bernard 1964, although if contemptuously claimed to as little as the smallest coin of the realm, e.g., without costs and nominal in Constantine -v- Imperial London Hotels 1944.
Circumstances in which a duty of care can be breached, except in the case of specific torts such as libel or trespass -or under the Rylands -v- Fletcher rule where lawfully but at one's own peril is made any unnatural use of land and excluding cases of immunity and circumstances where a statutory duty properly exercised infringes a right -such as the disturbance caused by the noise of aircraft taking of or landing - but not if improperly exercised: Fisher -v- Ruislip-Northwood UDC 1945, such circumstances may be even when a risk is know and not objected to: Smith -v- Charles Baker & Son 1891, indeed where a risk is known and has been consented to: Bowater -v- Rowley Regis Corp. 1944 ~even if there is contributory negligence: Stapley -v- Gypsum Mines Ltd 1953 -indeed even if despite instructions.
The standard is that of the 'reasonable man'; if injury was risked: Bolton -v- Stone 1951 ~6 times in 30 years meant not and the degree of the risk is proportional to the degree of care required; the seriousness of the injury risked too is proportional the degree of care necessary: Paris -v- Stepney BC 1951 -more so to employee blind in one eye, and not the amount but the type of the injury on the basis of: British Railways Board. -v- Herrington 1972; a social value whether justified the risk: in Fisher failure was not justified in war-time black-out to put up shaded lights to avoid public nuisance to a cyclist, in Watt -v- Hertfordshire CC 1954 getting the wrong vehicle on the scene of accident was justified by the valuable time that would have been lost in getting there help; the cost-benefit consideration: in Latimer -v- AEC 1953 to have done more than reasonable would have made the risk too remote in comparison -except if there is a statutory duty such as under the Health & Safety Acts; that standard in the case of an expert's negligence is, instead -Latimer, of a 'reasonable expert'.
The link between the breach of duty and the resultant damage must be shown to exist as a matter of fact or a matter of law. The former is subject to the 'but for' rule: in Barnett -v- Chelsea etc. Hospital etc. 1968 breach by the failure of the doctor to call was not the caused of death, McWilliams -v- Sir Arrol 1962 failed because the safety-belt would not have been worn if supplied, in Cutler -v- Vauxhall motors 1971 the operation on a graze had already been ordered for an ulcer on the site of it and was a pre-existing condition; but, is not broken a causative link by a consecutive cause and did not lessen a subsequent injury the original factors in Baker -v- Willoughby 1970, nor necessarily disentitle multiple causes when on a balance of probabilities the link considerably was the reason: McGhee -v- National Coal Board 1973; where the harm or part of it is from a third party's breach the 'but for' rule still applies to whether he type of injury could have been seen: Hogan -v Betinck Colliers 1949.
The latter only applies if the breach is not too remote, and it was not in Wieland -v- Cyril Lord Carpets 1969 that the fall elsewhere and later had resulted from the necessity to discard bi-focal glasses caused by the driver's negligence; the special sensitivity of the claimant did not matter -'egg-shell skull' rule: Robinson -v- Post Office 1974 -'one must take the victim as he finds him'; in The Wagonmound 1961 at the time of the breach that oil spilled could burn on sea-water could not reasonably, and in Doughty -v- Turner Mfg. 1964 because of the state of knowledge, have been foreseen; but in Bradford -v- Robinson Rentals 1967 the frostbite was because of providing a van without a heater.
The claimant's proof can move to the defendant: Steer -v- Durable Rubber 1956; at least some evidence is necessary of negligence even if 'facts speak for themselves' -they can not if the claimant can not say what happened: Wakelin -v- LSWR 1886, negligence can be inferred from absence of explanation by defendant, for any by claimant by Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 proportionate reduction is made.
Laws are subject to change, always ascertain current law.
